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Institutional Preconditions for Policy Success
Blake Hudson*
Policy failures receive much attention from the public and from policy makers adjusting
policy in response to failure. Yet, lessons learned from policy failures are necessarily ex post
observations. Not only has the policy failed to achieve its purposes, but a great deal of political,
institutional, temporal, and economic capital has been wasted. A new body of literature on
policy success undertakes ex ante analysis of successful policy designs, instrument choices, and
other policy-making variables to establish a framework for more effective policy making.
Though policy success may be inhibited by a variety of procedural, programmatic, or political
factors, institutional analysis—and specifically constitutional constraints on a government’s
ability to craft certain policy instruments—has not yet been incorporated into the policy success
and various other policy studies literatures. This Article is the first to undertake that integration
and demonstrates how institutional analysis in earlier stages of the policy cycle can help society
avoid constitutionally driven policy failures and move toward institutional policy successes.
Only when this institutional precondition is achieved will the procedural, programmatic, and
political components of a policy have an opportunity to succeed.
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Institutions do not suddenly appear fully formed; they have to be
invented.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In policy making, as with so many aspects of modern culture,
society pays close attention to policy weaknesses and failures.
Consider the recent launch of the Affordable Care Act (colloquially
known as “Obamacare”). The difficulties experienced in the initial
administration of the act rallied the detractors of the new health care
law and equally unnerved the policy’s supporters.2 It remains to be
seen whether Obamacare will be considered a substantively successful
policy in the vein of, for example, federal regulation of air quality
under the Clean Air Act (CAA),3 or rather a failure along the lines of
federal government control over the airline industry.4 Obamacare may
very well be viewed along a spectrum, as are most policies, with some
successes and some failures. Supporters may continue to promote the

1.
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Choice of Governing Instrument: A Retrospective, in
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE 51, 69 (Pearl Eliadis et al.
eds., 2005).
See Ezra Klein, Five Thoughts on the Obamacare Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 14,
2.
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/14/five-thoughts-on-theobamacare-disaster.
See J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND
3.
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170 (2008).
See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., ATA Airline Handbook, EMBRY-RIDDLE
4.
AERONAUTICAL UNIV. (June 7, 2008), http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/booksonline/1064.pdf.
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policy as a resounding success, and detractors may continue to decry it
as a perpetual failure.
Policy failure plays an important role in informing society and its
governments—often painfully—of how policies can lead to
unintended consequences, how existing policies can be improved, and
how to engage in more effective policy making. Unfortunately, lessons
learned from policy failures are necessarily ex post observations. For
example, beginning in the 1970s, some members of the policy-making
community argued that substantive environmental protection successes
would result if the government proactively mandated the use of
double-hulled oil tankers.5 Only after the EXXON VALDEZ spill and
the failure of the single-hulled tanker policy, however, did the U.S.
government craft a double-hulled approach.6 It is hardly controversial,
then, to suggest that rather than forging reactionary policies as a result
of policy failures, society should base policy on ex ante analyses of the
necessary ingredients for achieving policy successes. Framed slightly
differently, it is important to ask: what can be learned from arguably
less enamoring studies of policy success? And how can those studies
allow us to shift from reactionary, postfailure policy making to more
proactive approaches modeled after proven policy successes?
A growing body of scholarship establishing a theoretical
framework for “policy success” posits that we can learn more from
policy success than from failure.7 While this body of literature has
passingly made reference to the role of institutions in, specifically,
facilitating successful policies and, more generally, providing a
foundational component of the policy success theoretical framework,
legal institutional analysis has not made its way into this literature in
any robust manner. Specifically, while scholars have obviously
grappled with specific instances of policy failure due to a lack of
5.
See, e.g., M. Rosegay-Kott, Comment, The Impediments to Effective Regulation
of Oil Tanker Traffic in United States Waters, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 97-99 (1979).
6.
See Richard T. Sylves, How the Exxon Valdez Disaster Changed America’s Oil
Spill Emergency Management, 16 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 13 (1998);
Alaric Nightingale & Tony Hopfinger, Valdez Ghost Haunts Exxon with Spill-Prone Ships
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aBlNZuzlHXOM; Samuel K. Skinner & William K. Reilly, The EXXON
VALDEZ Oil Spill: A Report to the President, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.
(May 1989), http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/Exxon
Valdez_NRT_1989_report_to_president.pdf; Spill Prevention and Response, EXXON VALDEZ
OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.response
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
7.
ALLAN MCCONNELL, UNDERSTANDING POLICY SUCCESS: RETHINKING PUBLIC
POLICY 213 (2010).
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constitutional authority at some level of government8 or due to
unconstitutional constraints on individual rights,9 the key role of
constitutions in laying the legal foundation of policy success is understudied. This lack of study has impeded the valuable integration of
institutional analysis earlier in the policy cycle, so that policy makers
have tended to learn of institutional failures via judicial assessment
after a policy has been legislated, implemented, and challenged as
institutionally inadequate, rather than understand how institutional
structures may be adapted prior to the enactment of policies.
Policy scholars currently divide policy success into three different
categories. The first is “process success,” which, of course, is exactly
what it sounds like—maintaining policy-making processes and
procedures that can successfully facilitate policy formulation and
implementation.10 Ensuring notice-and-comment rule making for
substantive agency actions11 under the U.S. Administrative Procedure
Act is one example. Next, “program success” is the traditional way in
which we might think of policy success. Program success considers
the substance of policy rather than the procedures by which it was
formed12 and weighs the relative values provided by specific policies
against their costs. Program success is an objective measure of
outcomes evaluated relative to original policy goals and based upon
evidence rather than on political ideology.13 This is how one might
8.
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the
Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005); Blake Hudson, Commerce in the
Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause,
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 383 n.45 (2011); Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool:
State Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations,
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012).
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The
9.
Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
321, 354-61 (2005); Blake Hudson, The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines and the Untold
Story of the Lucas Remand, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99 (2009); William Michael Treanor,
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 5 (Georgetown Envtl. Law & Policy Inst.
Papers & Reports, 1998), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/2/.
10. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 40-45.
11. Substantive actions as opposed to interpretive rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. See Spirit of the Sage Council v.
Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated in part by 411 F.3d 225 (D.D.C. 2005).
12. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 45-49. The legitimacy of the policy’s formation
can, however, play a key role in whether it is viewed as a success or failure. Id. at 14.
Michael Howlett has highlighted substantive and procedural aspects of policy design
generally. See Michael Howlett & Raul P. Lejano, Tales from the Crypt: The Rise and Fall
(and Rebirth?) of Policy Design, 45 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 357, 360 (2013).
13. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 49-54; see also Wayne Parsons, From Muddling

Through to Muddling Up—Evidence Based Policy Making and the Modernisation of British
Government, 17 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 43 (2002) (analyzing evidence-based policy making in
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analyze whether the CAA, federal regulation of the airline industry,
and Obamacare may be deemed relative successes or failures. Finally,
“political success” is whether the processes utilized and the programs
implemented actually lead to good political outcomes for the
government enacting those policies.14 This is the component of policy
making whereby supporters of the policy may subjectively view it as a
success, and the policy’s detractors might characterize it as a failure,
rather than an objective analysis of policy goals versus outcomes. True
political success would engender a broader swath of support than may
be garnered for policies that remain contentious over time.
While these three categories provide an extremely useful
typology of policy success, the typology itself is incomplete. As this
Article demonstrates, a fourth category of success is a precondition for
each of the other three—“institutional success.” For a policy to be
evaluated as a process, program, or political success or failure it first:
(1) must be formulated by a level of government with legal authority to
engage in the chosen form of policy making and (2) must not unduly
infringe on the constitutional rights of the parties that it targets.
Consider these requirements for institutional success in turn.
First, what if a level of government does not have the constitutional
authority to pass a policy, or more specifically is found not to have that
authority after the policy is passed and even implemented?15 After all,
this was the basis for the rulings in United States v. Lopez16 and United
States v. Morrison,17 whereby the United States Supreme Court struck
down federal statutes aimed at regulatory subject matter traditionally
reserved for state governments under the United States Constitution
and thus lying beyond the federal government’s authority. While some
scholars may argue that these cases are anomalies,18 that proposition
simply remains unclear. Indeed, in the more recent National
the Labour government’s political agenda in the United Kingdom); Ian Sanderson,
Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making, 80 PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2002)
(emphasizing the need for “a sound evidence base for policy”).
14. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 49-54.
15. Throughout this Article, whenever constraints on governance authority are
discussed, the Article is speaking strictly about governance authority to pass prescriptive
regulatory policies, and not the use of voluntary, financial (subsidies and taxes), or other
incentive-based policies. Those are typically available to any government without
interference from other levels.
16. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. See 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18. Professor Claeys, for example, argued that the outcome of the Gonzalez v. Raich
case indicated that the newly born constraints on federal Commerce Clause authority arising
out of Lopez and Morrison “passed from youthful exuberance to middle-aged sobriety.”
Claeys, supra note 8, at 792; see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius19 case (regarding
Obamacare), Chief Justice John Roberts went out of his way to say
that the Affordable Care Act would not be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, but that it was instead constitutional under the
federal power to tax.20 Taken together, these relatively recent cases
demonstrate that situations may yet arise where one level of
government (here, federal)21 is found not to maintain constitutional
authority to choose a certain policy instrument. In this way, these
policies may be characterized as institutional failures—at least at
certain levels of government. Furthermore, as described later in this
Article, this scenario plays out far more often in the context of federal
preemption of state or local government legal authority or state
preemption of local authority, whereby lower levels of governments
would politically engage in successful policy making but are
institutionally constrained from doing so.22 Thus, opportunities to have
policy successes undermined by “legal authority” institutional
vulnerabilities abound.
Second, what if a policy is enacted and implemented, but is
challenged for illegally constraining constitutionally protected rights?
This is exactly the institutional vulnerability exposed in the case of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.23 In that case, the state of
South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act,24 prohibiting the
development of two beachfront lots, was challenged as an
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation in
violation of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.25 The United States
Supreme Court agreed, and the policy was abandoned.26 The
Beachfront Management Act was a case of process success because it
was validly enacted and implemented by South Carolina procedures.27
19. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
20. See id. at 2587, 2594; Tom Scocca, Obama Wins the Battle, Roberts Wins the
War, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
scocca/2012/06/roberts_health_care_opinion_commerce_clause_the_real_reason_the_chief_
justice_upheld_obamacare_.html.
21. Other levels of government may be similarly constrained. See Blake Hudson &
Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance
Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1273 (2013); infra Part II.A.
22. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21; Rosenbloom, supra note 8.
23. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
24. S.C. CODE §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-30 (2014).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause To
Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 237 (Gerald Korngold &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
27. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
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It was a program success because it protected ecosystems and thus
achieved outcomes matching well with its original goals.28 The
political success is clearly debatable, though the policy’s supporters
would at least characterize it as such. Even so, the policy was
decidedly an institutional failure. This is a case of the “infringing on
constitutional rights” category of institutional vulnerability. During the
design stage of the policy, the state simply had not adequately
considered the institutional (constitutional) constraints that could
jeopardize the policy’s success nor did it consider how to remedy those
vulnerabilities before carrying it completely through the policy cycle.
Of course, policy successes and failures are effectively the flip
side of the same coin—the same constitutional conditions that
contribute to policy failure are the ones that inhibit policy success. To
date, however, legal scholars have only discussed in an ad hoc fashion
how constitutional constraints on governance authority have inhibited
policy development.29 Those ad hoc legal analyses often only occur
after failure—that is, after a court has struck down a policy as
unconstitutional due to lack of governance authority or because it
infringes on constitutional rights. Without a holistic framework that
integrates legal principles and institutional analysis into the design
stage of the policy cycle, we will continue to see policy failures
highlighted far too late and at the evaluation stage, as with the cases of
Lopez, Morrison, and Lucas. This is very similar to the more common
politically driven (rather than institutionally driven) policy failures like
the EXXON VALDEZ spill, which presented ex post evaluative
criteria indicating that the substance of a one-hulled policy was a
failure when utilizing ex ante design criteria might have caused a shift
to a double-hulled policy before the failure occurred (which would
have therefore resulted in a policy success).30 While ad hoc accounts
of policy failures can lead to “policy learning,”31 which may help with
the design of future policies, a great degree of political, institutional,
temporal, economic, and natural capital has already been spent on the
failed policy. A better approach is to incorporate institutional analysis
into the design stage of policy development, as an ex ante component
of policy success instead of an ex post description of policy failure.

28. Id. at 897.
29. See sources cited supra notes 8-9.
30. See sources cited supra note 6.
31. See MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING PUBLIC
POLICY: POLICY CYCLES & POLICY SUBSYSTEMS 6 (3d ed. 2009).
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Before going further, one point of clarification should be made.
Governments may fully understand the institutional vulnerabilities that
can undermine a policy course of action and choose to go forward with
the policy anyway. This may either be a political calculation seeking to
highlight what policy makers perceive as an incorrect understanding of
the institutional status quo, or rather it may be to test the waters of
judicial interpretation regarding potential institutional vulnerabilities.
Regardless, this Article is concerned more with unintentional
institutional oversights in policy design, rather than those associated
with political gamesmanship. Of course, whether a policy is the
former or latter is not clear-cut, and policies likely fall along a
spectrum between those extremes. Yet institutional analysis is
important nonetheless to allow the most efficient use of political,
institutional, temporal, and economic capital.
This Article brings into the theoretical framework of policy
success the principle that a precondition for policy success is
maintaining institutions that are able to fully engage in policy making
without legal constraint—a task facilitated by the constitutional
structure and rules of a given governance regime. Without the
establishment of such preconditions, we may continue to see the
failure of important policies at certain levels of government. Part II of
this Article describes the institutional vulnerabilities that can inhibit
policy success. Part II describes the “governance commons” that can
arise when a level of government does not maintain the constitutional
authority to pass a prescriptive regulatory policy, such as when the
federal government does not have authority under its commerce or
other powers or when state and local policies are preempted by federal
or state (respectively) constitutional or legislative provisions. It also
discusses how guaranteed individual rights can lead to certain policies
being more institutionally vulnerable than others. Part III begins with
a discussion of the importance of institutions in policy making,
providing context for the Part’s subsequent review of the policy studies
literature. This review walks the reader through the history of policy
cycle studies, policy design, instrument choice, and policy failure to
the present-day focus on policy success. Throughout each of these
discussions, the Article will situate the role of constitutional
institutions within these literatures in an effort to integrate that analysis
into these literatures for the first time. Part IV will then briefly detail
practical applications of this integration by evaluating two policy
arenas where an institution’s role as a precondition for policy success
will be most critical in the coming years. These areas are direct land-
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use planning in the coastal zone and private forest management. Some
form of prescriptive, minimum-standards policy framework may be
needed in these areas in the coming decades, especially in light of
challenges posed by climate change. Yet these areas are land-use
regulatory roles long considered the sole prescriptive regulatory
purview of state and local governments. Thus, the prescriptive
regulation of each would potentially unconstitutionally curtail legal
rights. As a result, understanding the role that current policy-making
institutions play in such a regulatory framework’s success will be
critical.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES: THE GOVERNANCE
COMMONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A. Allocation of Legal Authority as an Institutional Vulnerability:
The Governance Commons
Recent scholarship describes the many ways in which legal
governance authority in federal systems may be constrained by
legislative or constitutional provisions.32 In this way, federal systems of
government may entrench a “governance commons,” whereby in the
absence of a coordinating authority—or perhaps because higher-level
authorities interfere with coordination at lower levels—numerous and
disparate “rational” governments are free to act in their own short-term
self-interest to the detriment of the federal system as a whole.33 In
other words, the constitutional structure of these systems makes them
institutionally vulnerable. Though the nuance of how these complex
governance commons operate is beyond the scope of this Article and is
otherwise documented in the literature,34 an ever-so-brief description of
the most salient features of the phenomenon is provided here for
context.
One iteration of the governance commons that may threaten
policy success is encapsulated by the constitutional reasoning
underpinning the cases of Lopez and Morrison. Those cases involved
challenges to the federal government’s authority to regulate subject
matters that the Court found were traditionally the role of state and
local governments and outside the scope of the United States
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. The lynchpin of the Court’s
32.
33.

See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21.

BLAKE HUDSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMONS: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL
GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2014).
34. See id.; Rosenbloom, supra note 8.
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rulings was that the regulated activity in these cases did not involve
economic activities that could be aggregated to determine whether
they had a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.35 Similarly, the
more recent Sebelius case, which tested the constitutionality of
Obamacare, also called Congress’s Commerce Clause authority into
question, though the health care law was upheld under the federal
power to tax.36 The constitutional foundation of other federal
programs, such as the Clean Water Act’s section 404 wetland-fill
program,37 have also been questioned by the Court, at least to the
extent that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might utilize
that program to regulate land-use activities traditionally subject to state
regulatory authority.38
Another way that institutional vulnerabilities can occur is when
the federal government uses its recognized authority to preempt
potential policy successes at lower levels of government (state and
local governments).39 This happens far more often than do findings of
constitutional restrictions on federal authority under Congress’s
Commerce Clause or other powers.40 Congressional preemption under
the CAA of local government efforts to regulate mobile sources
provides an example.41 This is a clear case of institutional failure at the
state or municipal level, but it is a failure compelled by the federal
government.
Similarly, because local governments do not exist under the
Constitution, state governments must empower local governments
legislatively or constitutionally through the grant of “home rule” or
pursuant to “Dillon’s Rule,” and states remain free to withhold or take

35. Hudson, supra note 8, at 383-84.
36. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
37. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
38. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
39. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 685, 694 (1991); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need To Limit
Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States
When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004).
40. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (1999).
Lopez and Morrison remain the only cases since 1937 where a federal statute was struck
down as beyond the scope of Congress’s constitutional authority. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett,
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 101 (2001).
41. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.
2010); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 184-87 (2006).
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back some of that power through preemption.42 State laws in
Pennsylvania, for example, have attempted to carve out exceptions
from local zoning laws for various oil- and gas-related activities, to
preempt local governments from engaging in regulation of energy
development, and even to transfer the power of eminent domain to
natural gas corporations.43 These laws have been challenged as
unconstitutional by local governments.44 While such challenges have
been successful in Pennsylvania,45 other states have successfully
preempted similar local policies.46 Unlike the constraints that lowerlevel governments can place on federal authority under Commerce
Clause analysis, this is yet another compulsion of institutional
vulnerability by a higher-level government.

B.

Infringement of Individual Rights as an Institutional Vulnerability

Distinct from the question of allocating regulatory authority
between levels of government, some institutional vulnerabilities arise
because judicial interpretations of individual constitutional rights
provisions conclude that a policy was enacted or implemented in a
constitutionally impermissible manner. The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, which states “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation,”47 provides a prime example.
The volume of scholarship on Fifth Amendment constraints on policy
success is robust, so this Article only provides a brief example here,
while Part IV expounds further on other examples salient to the coastal
zone.
As noted in the Introduction, the case of Lucas involved a
challenge to the state of South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act
(BMA), which aimed to protect the South Carolina coast from a
variety of harms caused by coastal development.48 Because the BMA
barred David Lucas from erecting homes on his property, he brought a
takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
42. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21, at 1308-09.
43. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-3504 (2012) (seeking to preempt local zoning
ordinances that regulate oil and gas operations).
44. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2006);
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85; Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
45. See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d 901.
46. See Energy Mgmt., 467 F.3d 471; Morrison, 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. S.C. CODE §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-30 (2014); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1008, 1022 n.10 (1992).
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Constitution.49 The Supreme Court ultimately found that any
regulation that wiped out all economic value in a piece of property was
categorically a “regulatory taking,” unless background principles of the
state’s law of nuisance or property inhered in the property’s title.50 On
remand to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the state was unable to
prove any such background principles applied and was therefore
required to pay just compensation to Lucas.51 The state paid Lucas
$850,000 for the two lots, but then, realizing it would be unable to
afford implementation of a policy that required this magnitude of
private landowner compensation, sold the lots and effectively gave up
on its policy as originally constituted (the lots were later developed).52
The lawyer for the state of South Carolina, when describing why the
state pursued implementation of the policy even in the face of a
takings claim, stated, “The general notion was that if you let this one
go, then the Beachfront Management Act would tumble into the
ocean.”53 And that is exactly what happened. Indeed, South Carolina’s
action sounded in Justice Holmes’s observation that “[g]overnment
hardly could go on” if it had to pay for every diminution of property
value caused by regulation.54
A total economic deprivation of property does not occur with
frequency, and a number of “background principles” have
subsequently been invoked to overcome these types of takings claims.55
Nonetheless, at times—as in Lucas—policies do not succeed because
at the evaluation stage of the policy cycle (here, the judicial stage) it is
determined that the government did not have authority that it initially
claimed.56 While a government may have thought it could enact a
49. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
50. Id. at 1029.
51. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992); see also Oral
Argument Before the South Carolina Supreme Court on Remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Decision, Lucas, 424 S.E.2d 484 (audio recording on file with South Carolina
Supreme Court Library) (failing to persuade the court that the construction of a home on
fragile beach land constituted a nuisance); Hudson, supra note 9 (discussing the Lucas
remand).
52. See Been, supra note 26, at 221.
53. DVD: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council at 12:50 (Duke University
School of Law 2005), available at http://web.law.duke.edu/voices/lucas. One of the lawyers
working for Lucas even described the South Carolina Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the
state prior to the U.S. Supreme Court hearing as encapsulating the following logic: “if we
rule . . . with ’em . . . we are going to either gut this act . . . or we are going to break the state.”
Id. at 17:30.
54. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
55. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 9.
56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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regulation without paying compensation, it may be required to do so
after constitutional challenge. If the government does not have the
revenue to compensate (and perhaps even if it does), then its
institutional miscalculation will lead to process, program, and political
failure.
In fact, the way in which the constitutional rights institutional
vulnerability may be exposed with more regularity is a chilling of
regulatory policy-making efforts by governments out of concern that
challenged policies will fail at the evaluation stage if courts order
regulatory takings compensation.57 Take, for example, Oregon’s
referendum Measure 37, which required either compensation for the
adverse economic effects of regulations or a government waiver of
enforcement of the regulations.58 A study of the effects of Measure 37
found that in virtually every instance of a claim of diminution of
property value due to regulation, the government granted a waiver.59
This is institutional failure.
While there are certainly competing values provided by the
Takings Clause in the form of property rights protections, some
scholars question whether the Constitution supports a regulatory
takings doctrine at all.60 In this sense, perhaps the institutional failure
can be an inappropriate application of a constitutional rule or the
creation of constitutional rules that are not fully supported by the
Constitution (at least in the view of some constitutional scholars).
Ultimately, constitutional provisions protecting individual rights
play a role in undermining process, program, and political policy
success. These institutional constraints on policy success should be
integrated more thoroughly into the literature so that institutional
vulnerabilities can be remedied at the policy design stage, rather than
57. See Tim Mulvaney, Takings Case Set for Oral Argument at the SCOTUS on
January 15th, ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
environmental_law/2013/01/takings-case-set-for-oral-argument-at-the-scotus-on-january-15th.html.
58. John D. Echeverria, Property Values and Oregon Measure 37: Exposing the False
Premise of Regulation’s Harm to Landowners, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y INST. 4 (2007),
http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current_research/documents/GELPIMeasure37Report.pdf.
Measure 37 has since been significantly limited in application by Measure 49. See Measure
49 Guide, OR. DEP’T LAND CONSERVATION & DEV. (Mar. 7, 2008) http://www.oregon.gov/
LCD/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49_guide.pdf.
59. Echeverria, supra note 58.
60. Treanor, supra note 9, at 1; see also PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND
SOCIAL MORALITY 286-90, 299-310 (2014) (arguing that property regulations that do not
affect private owners’ ability to exclude others from the use of their property do not constitute
“takings” under the Fifth Amendment and therefore should not be subject to the amendment’s
compensation requirement).
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at the evaluation stage through judicial review. The next Subpart
provides a mechanism for evaluating the role of each of the
institutional vulnerabilities described above in inhibiting policy
success.

C.

Institutional Vulnerabilities Within the Precondition Framework

Prior research provides a framework useful for depicting how the
institutional vulnerabilities described in this Part can undermine policy
success.61 A modified version of this framework is shown infra Figure
1. As discussed infra Part III.B., the policy cycle has been studied in
detail, breaking out policy making into stages of agenda setting, policy
formulation, decision making, implementation, and policy evaluation.
Even so, scant attention has been given to the overarching framework
in which this cycle operates. Though somewhat oversimplified, at the
most fundamental level policy success requires the presence of four
components: (1) institutional capacity of the government to formulate
policy, (2) political will of the government to formulate policy,
(3) institutional capacity of the government to implement policy, and
(4) political will of the government to implement policy. These
components intersect as shown in Figure 1. The presence of all four
components indicates a policy success. When institutional capacity to
formulate and institutional capacity to implement intersect, we have a
sufficient policy-making institution. When political will to formulate
and political will to implement intersect, we have sufficient policymaking political will. Similarly, a government may have both
institutional capacity and political will to formulate policy, which
results in successful policy formulation, but it may not have
institutional capacity and political will to implement, which can
undermine an otherwise duly constituted policy’s success. On the
other hand, perhaps there are sufficient institutions and sufficient
political will to implement, leading to successful policy implementation, but the policy itself has institutional flaws (lack of component 1)
or was crafted in a politically inefficacious way (lack of component 2).
In this way, all four components must be present before policy success
can occur.

61. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of
Forests in Regulating Climate Change, 87 IND. L.J. 1455 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson,
Regulating Climate Change]; Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested
Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Nested Commons
Governance]; HUDSON, supra note 33.
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The allocation of governance authority among levels of
government cuts right to the core of component 1. Without authority
to prescriptively regulate, for example, it does not matter if political
will to formulate a policy exists in combination with political will and
institutional capacity to implement. Constitutional infringement, on
the other hand, more clearly falls into the component 3 category. For
example, in the property context the government may very well have
had the institutional capacity to formulate the policy (i.e., the legal
authority, component 1), but does not have the institutional capacity to
implement the policy if it must award just compensation in order to
make the policy a process and program success.
Figure 1.

Consider some examples that drive home the utility of the
framework. First, an example of policy success in the United States—
the CAA.62 The Commerce Clause provides federal regulatory
authority over regulation of industrial air pollutants (component 1),
and Congress successfully acted on its political will to regulate those
62.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2012).

684

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:669

pollutants by passing the CAA (component 2). The EPA then
successfully exercised its administrative authority and also enlisted
state government support in implementing the CAA, which provides
sufficient institutional capacity to enforce the act (component 3).
Finally, though enforcement of any statute like the CAA may be
improved, there also exists sufficient political will to enforce the CAA
(component 4), as demonstrated by the continued monitoring and
enforcement actions performed by administrative agencies
implementing the statute. The presence of these four components has
resulted in a successful process, program, political, and, importantly,
institutional success: the CAA has sound procedural mechanisms for
carrying out its dictates (process success); air quality in the United
States has improved greatly since the passage of the CAA and
continues to improve (program success); the CAA is widely accepted
as a valuable and successful regulatory program (political success);
and the authority of the federal government to formulate and
implement the CAA stands on strong ground (institutional success).
Next, consider the cases of Lopez and Morrison. In those cases,
Congress, believing it had the institutional authority to formulate the
policies in question (component 1), acted on its political will to
formulate policy by passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the
Violence Against Women Act, respectively (component 2).63 The
institutional capacity and political will to implement these policies
existed (components 3 and 4). And yet even after the government had
implemented them, an ex post challenge to component 1 resulted in a
finding that component 1 did not exist. The lack of institutional
capacity (and thus institutional success) created process, program, and
political failures for these statutes.
What about federal preemption, such as our example of mobile
sources under the CAA? In Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v.
City of New York, the city thought it had institutional capacity to
formulate a policy mandating heightened fuel efficiency standards for
its taxi fleet (component 1).64 It crafted a policy to do so out of its
political will to formulate policy (component 2) and presumably
maintained the institutional capacity and political will to implement
the policy (components 3 and 4). Yet, the federal government stepped
in and preemptively declared that the city did not have component 1,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed,
63. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
64. 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
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thus forcing institutional failure at the municipal level.65 Similarly,
state governments may preempt or inhibit institutional capacity to
formulate policy, as have states establishing that local governments do
not maintain component 1 in the context of natural gas fracking
regulation.66
Finally, consider the Lucas case. The state of South Carolina
maintained the institutional enforcement capacity to pass the BMA
(component 1) and did so via political will to formulate policy
(component 2).67 For a time, it maintained institutional capacity to
enforce (component 3) because it did not have to compensate
landowners for the restrictions placed on private property rights.68 The
state also maintained the political will to implement the policy
(component 4), as evidenced by the results the policy achieved on the
ground, particularly as applied to Lucas (prohibition of development of
his lots).69 Yet, after a judicial ruling declaring that the regulation was a
taking of property for which just compensation was owed, South
Carolina quickly realized it did not have the institutional capacity to
implement the policy (component 3)—it simply could not
administratively afford to pay every property owner affected by the
policy.70 Thus, the policy’s process, program, and political success
were compromised by an institutional vulnerability.
Having detailed the primary types of institutional vulnerabilities
that can hamstring policy success and raised a few examples of how
they may arise, the next Part sets to task incorporating the role of
institutions more fully into the policy literature—culminating with
their key role in contributing to policy success.
III. REMEDYING INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES AS A
PRECONDITION FOR POLICY SUCCESS: THE POLICY
LITERATURE
[U]nless we . . . can offer clear theories of how . . . institutions[] and
policy are connected and deduce predictions from these theories, we
shall simply be telling ad hoc stories.71
65.
66.

Id.
See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2006);

State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85.
67. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. David W. Brady, The Causes and Consequences of Divided Government: Toward
a New Theory of American Politics?, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194 (1993).
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To understand the role of constitutional institutions in policy
success it is useful to first ask: what is policy study and why is it
important? Most simply, “public policy” is “whatever governments
choose to do or not to do.”72 William Jenkins provided a more detailed
definition, describing public policy as “‘a set of interrelated decisions
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of
goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation

where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of
those actors to achieve.’”73 This last part of Jenkins’s definition is
where constitutional allocation of governance authority and the ability
of governments to act without violating constitutionally protected
rights come into play. Indeed, Jenkins’s work acknowledges that “a
government’s capacity to implement its decisions is also a significant
component of public policy” and that “limitations on a government’s
ability to act can constrain the range of options considered in particular
decision-making circumstances or can contribute to the success or lack
of success of policy-making efforts.”74 Most of these limitations have
been described by policy scholars as including financial, personnel,
and informational resource limitations; limitations imposed by
international obligations; or limitations imposed by domestic politics.75
On the other hand, domestic institutions and legal structures seem to
have been largely overlooked in this literature.
The remainder of this Part describes more fully how institutions
fit within the many subdisciplines of policy study. While there is no
perfect order in which to proceed, the Subparts below review the most
relevant primary subdisciplines of policy study and detail in particular
the limited institutional analysis that has been undertaken in those
areas (at least with regard to legal institutions). This survey of policy
studies literature highlights the repeated absence of analysis of how
constitutional institutions allocate governance authority among levels
of government or may be constrained by individual rights
considerations. The Part makes an initial attempt to integrate that
analysis into the theoretical framework of policy studies.

72. THOMAS R. DYE, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1972).
73. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting W.I.
JENKINS, POLICY ANALYSIS: A POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (1978)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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A. New Institutionalism and Constitutions as “Meta-Institutions”
Analysis of the institutions that engage in public policy making
has been said to be the “broadest perspective” in policy studies.76 Even
so, such analysis typically focuses on the structure of political and
economic systems through the review of bureaucracy, legislatures, and
courts.77 These institutions in the United States, however, are
embedded within a legal, institutional superstructure—that is, the text
of the Constitution and the canon of constitutional law interpreting its
provisions. We can therefore call constitutional law a meta-institution78
that subsumes all of the typical institutions reviewed in policy studies,
such as those arising out of the executive, the legislature, and the
judiciary.
Institutions have long been seen to “influence actions by shaping
the interpretation of problems and possible solutions by policy actors,
and by constraining the choice of solutions and the way and extent to
which they can be implemented.”79 Recently, however, scholars have
renewed their interest in the role of institutions in policy making, but
with a slightly expanded focus. Scholars of “new” (or “neo”)
institutionalism take the perspective that institutions are independent
variables that shape policy outcomes80 and “seek[] to identify how
rules, norms, and symbols affect political behaviour; how the
configuration of governmental institutions affects what the state does;
and how unique patterns of historical development can constrain
subsequent choices about public problem-solving.”81 Neoinstitutionalism literature has at least cursorily referenced federalism and
individual rights protections (such as property rights).82 Even so,
rigorous examination of constitutional governance constraints has not
Id. at 31.
Id.
See id. at 52.
Id. at 44; accord id. at 262; James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Institutional
Perspectives on Political Institutions, 9 GOVERNANCE 247 (1996) (published version of the
76.
77.
78.
79.

Address before the International Political Science Association in Berlin).
80. Trebilcock, supra note 1, at 69; see also MICHAEL M. ATKINSON, GOVERNING
CANADA: INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993) (examining the structure and impact of
political institutions in Canada); DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A.
Rockman eds., 1993) (discussing and comparing political institutions in the United States
with other parliamentary systems); POLICY STUDIES IN CANADA: THE STATE OF THE ART
(Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett & David Laycock eds., 1996) (discussing the past,
present, and future of policy studies in Canada).
81. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 44 (citation omitted); accord Fritz
W. Scharpf, Institutions in Comparative Policy Research, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 762 (2000).
82. See sources cited supra notes 80-81.
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made its way into this literature.83 Despite this lack of attention, it is
clear that with constitutional institutions “the organization and
character of . . . institutions play a critical role in determining policy
outcomes.”84 It has been said that “[i]nstitutions do not suddenly
appear fully formed; they have to be invented.”85 While this is
definitely true for agencies, legislatures, and courts, how much more
so is it true of constitutions, the mother of all other institutions?
Neoinstitutionalism builds off of institutionalism’s primary focus
on formal rules and extends to study the role of power, values, and,
most importantly for this Article, how the past is a “prime shaper of
the future.”86 It has not gone entirely unnoticed in the literature that
institutions include “legal . . . codes and rules that affect how
individuals and groups calculate optimal strategies and courses of
action.”87 Yet, constitutional rules established largely at the outset of
our nation are perhaps the most important shaper of the future of U.S.
policy, and each federal system maintains a unique pattern of historical
development that constrains policy making to varying degrees.
Neoinstitutionalists argue: “[S]tate institutions assume a privileged
role in the explanation of policy outputs. They represent a ‘crystallization’ of the effects of economic factors, ideas, and interests, and they
constitute the primary vehicle through which these factors are brought
to bear on policy . . . .”88 Indeed, this seems especially true of
federalism, whereby strong notions of a need for decentralization
(driven by economic, political, and cultural considerations) remain
embedded deeply within the institutional structure, as do economic,
political, and cultural perspectives that inform views on property rights
and associated doctrines, like regulatory takings. Though it is true that
these institutions “also generate ideas and interests through a process
of institutional evolution over time,”89 the crystallization of ideas that
occurred long ago—dating back to the Federalist/Anti-Federalist

83. Trebilcock, supra note 1, at 69.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 223.
87. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 44 (citation omitted); accord Elinor
Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and
Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 35 (Pail A. Sabatier ed.,
1999).
88. NINETTE KELLEY & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE MAKING OF THE MOSAIC: A
HISTORY OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 11 (2d ed. 2010).
89. Id.
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debates at the Constitutional Convention in the United States—can
lead to a policy-making rigidity that is hard to overcome.90
Indeed, the Constitution provides good study for “statist” theory.
It creates institutional inertia by allocating governance authority
between federal and state governments in a certain manner and by
setting rules for the protection of individual rights. When courts
interpret the Constitution, this inertia gains energy and becomes
entrenched further over time. Theories of “statism” stand for the
proposition that “each political system has an underlying logic and a
matching set of interrelated institutions that foster certain choices and
hinder others.”91 Some scholars of public policy note that under a
statist view, “institutions can only rarely be . . . modified[] or replaced
without a considerable degree of effort.”92 This is certainly the case
with constitutions. In the United States, the unique pattern of
historical development of constitutional rules regarding certain subject
areas, like land-use planning and subnational forestry, most certainly
affect policy making across scales in those areas. In this way, constitutional institutions may be the poster child for “path dependency,”
which stands for the premise that “in policy-making, ‘history
matters’.”93 Path dependency posits that “new decisions are shaped
and constrained by increasing returns generated by the costs of
continuing with existing trajectories and the high costs of alternative
trajectories.”94 Constitutions perhaps form the basis for some of the
most stringent forms of “policy legacies,” which show that “once a
system is in place, it tends to perpetuate itself by limiting the range of
choices or the ability of forces both outside (‘exogenous’) and inside
(‘endogenous’) the system to alter that trajectory.”95
Despite the fact that institutions like constitutions are hard to
change, they need to be understood as a key component of policy
success theory. Failure to recognize institutional success as a
precondition for process, program, and political policy success will
inhibit policy makers’ and advocates’ ability to identify what types of
90. Though ideas and values may have shifted toward a desire to change the
constitutional status quo, they may not have shifted enough to meet the “super-supermajority”
thresholds required for institutional reforms. See infra text accompanying note 170.
91. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 45; accord Introduction to Varieties
of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
92. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 52.
93. Id. at 200.
94. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 223; accord Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000).
95. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 200.
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institutional alterations are needed—either through constitutional
amendment or judicial interpretation. In contrast, recognizing
institutional vulnerabilities will help policy makers alter policyinstrument choice to the extent that such vulnerabilities cannot be
overcome at the time of policy design, such as through choosing
incentive-based instruments over prescriptive ones.

B.

The Policy Cycle: Integrating Institutional Analysis into the
Cycle

Policy studies have historically focused on the series of stages
through which policy making occurs—known as the “policy cycle.”96
These stages are often set out in a linear fashion as a discrete series of
sequential steps. Over time, however, the term “cycle” has become a
preferred descriptor, because the stages do not always occur linearly,
but rather can occur nonsequentially with each stage often feeding
back into an earlier stage of the cycle.
One of the early pioneers of policy studies, Harold Lasswell,
divided the policy-making process into seven stages,97 and he was
followed by numerous scholars who slightly modified his original
stages but maintained the overall “logic” of analysis.98 Ultimately, the
logic of modern policy studies distills the policy cycle into five stages:
(1) agenda setting,99 (2) policy formulation, (3) decision making,
(4) policy implementation, and (5) policy evaluation.100
The policy cycle approach has been touted as providing more
clarity to the dynamics of policy making by breaking policy processes
into discernable components that can be studied with more focus.101
These disaggregated components may also be studied relative to each
other to determine the drivers of policy success or failure.102 The
approach has been touted as flexible enough to analyze policy across
virtually all scales, from local governments to international regimes,103
96. Id. at 92.
97. MICHAEL HOWLETT, DESIGNING PUBLIC POLICIES: PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS
18 (2011); see also HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES (1971)
(discussing the development and impact of policy sciences).
98. See HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 18.
99. Peters and Hoornbeek describe agenda setting as primarily assessing “what is the
problem?” B. Guy Peters & John A. Hoornbeek, The Problem of Policy Problems, in
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 77, 83.
100. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 18-19; see also HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra
note 31, at 3 (explaining how the policy cycle can be broken into successive stages).
101. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 13.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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and to facilitate the study of a number of nongovernmental actors in
the policy cycle, including private organizations and citizens.104
Michael Howlett and other policy scholars have described the
stages of the policy cycle as “sequential policy cycle[s] [that] set out
the basic steps through which policy processes unfold” and asserted
that the study of “successive iterations of the cycle” will help “improve
upon policy outcomes.”105 This improvement has become known as
“policy learning.”106 Though policy learning might typically be
thought of as learning about which instruments of implementation do
or do not work to various degrees, we can also understand institutional
analysis as an important component of policy learning—whereby
analysts study the constitutional vulnerabilities that allow or constrain
other instrument choice options and apply those lessons to future
policy-making efforts. Sometimes, there may be no learning that can
help improve a policy. Rather, there may only be recognition that one
level of government cannot utilize certain policy instruments due to a
lack of constitutional authority. But this is an equally important
observation to glean from policy studies. Scholars have noted as much
by acknowledging that at times entire policy regimes can fail.107 Lack
of constitutional authority to engage in policy making or a policy’s
violation of constitutional rights can be a contributor to such regime
failure.
A potential criticism of the policy cycle approach, of course, is
that characterization as a cycle suggests that policy making typically
proceeds in a progressive, systematic fashion, which is often not the
case.108 Policy making may be reactionary rather than proactive, may
skip phases, and may otherwise occur in a nonlinear fashion.109
Howlett notes, “The cycle may not be a single iterative loop, for
example, but rather a series of smaller loops in which, to cite just one
possibility, the results of past implementation decisions may have a
major impact on future policy formulation . . . .”110 One of these
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 182.
108. Id. at 13.
109. See id. at 285; DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 9
(1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66
(1972); Arco Timmermans & Ivar Bleiklie, Institutional Conditions for Policy Design: Types
of Arenas and Rules of the Game, EUR. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. RES. (Mar. 1999) http://ecpr.
eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d24abcd8-1d52-4db9-a1e8-1743bb9c88e4.pdf (paper presented
at the European Consortium of Political Research, Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim).
110. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 13-14.
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smaller loops might occur, for example, due to a judicial ruling that
takes place in the evaluation stage. As detailed in Part II.C, the agenda
may have been set, the policy formulated and implemented, and only
afterwards does judicial evaluation determine that there was no
legislative authority to formulate the policy in the first instance, thus
resetting the cycle to a prior stage in the loop. In this way, it is true that
“[a] better model is needed that delineates in greater detail the actors
and institutions involved in the policy process, helps identify the
instruments available to policy-makers, and points out the factors that
lead to certain policy outcomes rather than others.”111 Integrating
institutional analysis earlier in the cycle and highlighting
vulnerabilities that can undermine institutional success may increase
the chances of achieving better outcomes, avoiding the need to
abandon policies because their unconstitutionality renders their
process, program, or political success meaningless. It is therefore
important to ask: where is institutional analysis most valuable in the
five stages of the policy cycle? The answer is at the policy
formulation, decision-making, and evaluation stages, described in turn
below.
As scholars have acknowledged, “Policy formulation . . . involves
identifying both the technical and political constraints on state
action.”112 Constitutional constraints would be a technical constraint
under this categorization. Other scholars have described these types of
institutional constraints, and in particular constitutional provisions in
federal systems, as procedural constraints manifesting during the
Thorough consideration of such
policy formulation stage.113
constraints may lead to significant changes in the substance of a
policy—how a government plans to handle potential regulatory takings
and just compensation claims, for example.
Similarly, the decision-making stage is the stage in which policy
makers make choices about precisely what action (or even inaction)
the government will pursue. Undertaking institutional analysis may
compel inaction, or it may lead to a choice not to pursue prescriptive
regulatory instruments until the institutional vulnerability can be
remedied. Understanding potential institutional constraints on the
111. Id. at 14 (citation omitted); accord Daniel A. Mazmanian & Paul A. Sabatier, A
Multivariate Model of Public Policy-Making, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 439 (1980).
112. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 30 (citation omitted); accord Peter J. May, Hints for
Crafting Alternative Policies, 7 POL’Y ANALYSIS 227 (1981); Mara S. Sidney, Policy
Formulation: Design and Tools, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: THEORY,
POLITICS, AND METHODS 79 (Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller & Mara S. Sidney eds., 2007).
113. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 113.
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policy chosen can have a significant impact on its viability and
potential for success. Yet, institutional analysis is often overlooked in
the design stage, leaving the evaluation stage as the next step in the
cycle where any institutional vulnerabilities are likely to be exposed.
The evaluation stage of the policy cycle114 is the stage where we
might hope to avoid questions of whether there is or is not institutional
success. In other words, if that question is seriously in doubt by the
time a policy reaches the evaluation stage—that is, when a judicial
review of a policy’s constitutionality takes place—then a finding of
institutional failure will be yet another ex post observation and a waste
of political, economic, temporal, and other resources. Generally, the
evaluation stage is most important for the “policy learning”
opportunity that it provides. As policy scholars have argued:
[P]erhaps the greatest benefits of policy evaluation are not the direct
results it generates in terms of definitive assessments of the success and
failure of particular policies per se, but rather the educational dynamic
that it can stimulate among policy-makers as well as others less directly
115
involved in policy issues.

In other words, “[I]mprovements or enhancements to policy-making
and policy outcomes can be brought about through careful and
deliberate assessment of how past stages of the policy cycle affected
both the original goals adopted by governments and the means
implemented to address them.”116 This is most true for process,
program, and political success analysis because the relative failures
and successes of policy form the basis of trial-and-error policy
experiments that can be improved upon over time.117 Peter Hall frames
this as “endogenous learning,” which he describes as “a deliberate
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past
experience and new information” so as to better attain the ultimate

114. Policy scholars have noted that judicial review may be important to assess
constitutional provisions related to executive administration of law and even those related to
the second category of institutional vulnerability highlighted in this Article—an infringement
on individual rights. Id. at 189. No mention is made, however, of the allocation of
governance authority to specific levels of government. See Peter D. Jacobson, Elizabeth
Selvin & Scott D. Pomfret, The Role of the Courts in Shaping Health Policy: An Empirical
Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278 (2001) (analyzing how courts shape health policy).
115. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 179 (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
117. Id.
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objects of governance.118 Thus, policy learning through evaluation can
help us understand why some policies succeed and others fail.119
Yet, an evaluative judicial ruling that finds an institutional failure
most likely means that the policy must be abandoned. While this is
useful for helping policy makers understand that the policy should
never have been crafted in its then-current form or that the instrument
originally utilized will no longer be an option, it amounts to a complete
evisceration of the process, program, and political success that might
otherwise have been achieved by the policy. If a judicial body
determines that a level of government does not have constitutional
authority to enact a policy or unconstitutionally infringes on individual
rights, then policy makers are effectively back to square one—the
agenda-setting stage. In this situation, a new cycle may involve the
crafting of a nonprescriptive policy at that level of government.120 That
policy, in turn, may be unable to achieve robust program success,
which may be why a prescriptive approach was chosen to begin with.
Or perhaps the policy just ceases to exist in prescriptive or
nonprescriptive form and is thus “terminated” no matter how
important the policy’s programmatic goals may have been.121
It is clearly important to integrate institutional considerations into
policy cycle studies to better understand how issues like constitutional
authority impact each stage. Even so, as discussed in the next Subpart,
institutional analysis should not be undertaken only in a vacuum
regarding each stage, but rather should be integrated into a broader
perspective of how we design policies from the time they are
conceived until the time they are implemented and evaluated.

C.

Policy Design: Keying on Institutional Design
Understanding exactly how instrument choices are constrained by
higher-order sets of variables is thus crucial to making correct policy
122
design decisions in specific policy-making contexts.

While the policy cycle might be thought of as analyzing each of
the iterative stages of the policy-making process, policy design may be
conceived more broadly as the study of how to create policies that
effectively integrate each stage. Policy design studies also assess
118. Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of
Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 278 (1993).
119. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 180.
120. Id. at 191.
121. Id.
122. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 14.
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whether and how the overarching design of policy effectuates success
at each stage and as a result, success of the policy as a whole. Even
though policy design is the overarching structure in which policy
making takes place, it has received far less attention in the literature
than its constituent components of agenda setting; instrument choice;
and policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation.123 Though it
may be housed within the study of governance more broadly, Howlett
argues that governance studies have occurred “without the benefit of
clear and systematic analysis” of policy design.124 Howlett posits that
such study is warranted because “the purpose and expectations of
policy design have always been clear[—]improving policy-making and
policy outcomes through the accurate anticipation of the consequences
of government actions.”125
How then do institutions, like constitutions, figure into the larger
study of policy design and, specifically, designs that facilitate
successful policies?126 The answer is that constitutions are the ultimate
“designers” of policy in that they establish the ground rules for how
subsidiary governmental entities may formulate policy, like legislatures at one or more levels of government. They also set the ground
rules for permissible or impermissible government actions, such as the
taking of property without just compensation. The policy design
literature contemplates policy design’s codependence with the
institutions that effectuate its purpose, because “policy design is very
much situated in the ‘contextual’ orientation which is characteristic of
modern policy science. That is, it is an activity or set of activities
which takes place within a specific historical and institutional context
that largely determines its content.”127
Indeed, one of the preconditions for policy design success is “the
need for designers to thoroughly analyze and understand the ‘policy
space’ in which they are working” because “policy formulation
typically occurs within the confines of an existing governance mode
HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31.
HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 3 (citation omitted).
Id. (citations omitted); accord JAN TINBERGEN, THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT
TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN (1956); D.A. Schön,
Designing as Reflective Conversation with the Materials of a Design Situation, 5
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 3 (1992).
126. Though some accounts within the public policy literature highlight the role of law
in the design of public policy, they focus primarily on “private and public law; private civil or
tort law and common law; [and] public criminal and administrative law.” HOWLETT, supra
note 97, at 85. There is no substantive discussion of the role of constitutional law within
these discussions.
127. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
123.
124.
125.
(1958); J.
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and policy logic which simplifies the task of policy design.”128 Even
so, success of specific policies will occur “only if these contextual
constraints are diagnosed accurately,”129 and “[u]nderstanding exactly
how instrument choices are constrained by higher-order sets of
variables is thus crucial to making correct policy design decisions in
specific policy-making contexts.”130 In particular, studying success in
an institutional context might help a governance society avoid “lockin,” which results when “institutional feedback mechanisms are selfreinforcing and, therefore, reforms will tend to follow established
patterns.”131
Howlett implicitly hints at the impacts of federal governance on
policy design: “Adopting a multi-level, nested model of policy context
helps clarify what ‘room’ exists at what level of policy for new or
alternative policy design elements.”132 The clarity that multilevel,
nested federal systems provide regarding the “room” that each level of
government maintains is not always clear.133 Nonetheless, in many
instances it is fairly clear (or at least constitutionally debatable) that
certain levels of government do not maintain the legal authority to
utilize certain instruments, such as prescriptive regulation. This is the
institutional context within which certain policies are designed in
federal systems like those of the United States and Canada.
Howlett argues that there are three fundamental aspects to policy
design: “(1) knowledge of the basic building blocks or materials with
which actors must work in constructing a (policy) object; (2) the
elaboration of a set of principles regarding how these materials should
be combined in that construction; and (3) understanding the process by
which a design becomes translated into reality.”134 The study of
constitutional authority in federal systems falls under the first and
second aspects, which basically entail “understanding the nuances of
policy formulation,”135 and also impacts the third aspect because
128. Id. at 141.
129. Id. (citing Louis Meuleman, The Cultural Dimension of Metagovernance: Why
Governance Doctrines May Fail, 10 PUB. ORG. REV. 49 (2010)).
130. Id.
131. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 210.
132. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 142 (citation omitted).
133. For example, there is great debate under provisions of the U.S. Constitution, such
as the Commerce Clause, about whether the federal government, state governments, or both
maintain constitutional authority to prescriptively regulate resources like isolated wetlands.
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
134. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 139.
135. Id.
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institutional factors that complicate policy formulation prevent certain
policy designs from becoming reality. Indeed, we might actually say
that the study of institutional design is a precondition of the study of
policy design, because the latter is wholly dependent upon the design
of institutions from which policy emanates. In other words, just as
institutional authority is a precondition to process, program, and
political policy success, the study of institutional design is necessary to
understand if and when certain instruments may legally flow from
institutions. One of the arguably less obvious, but most important,
reasons why is because such study can shed light on the historical
inertia that institutions and especially constitutional law carry forward
to maintain the institutional status quo.
Indeed, constitutional analysis would fit quite well within the
recent direction of policy design studies, which have analyzed “policy
regime logics” and “governance modes.” Scholars have noted that
because “governance modes typically change only very slowly over
time, patterns of government instrument choices tend to exhibit a
surprising amount of similarity within policy sectors and over time.”136
Thus, once a governance mode is established via constitutional text, it
is very difficult to change, and certain policy designs may be restricted
or otherwise limited in scope until a change in the constitutional status
quo occurs. So, for example, constitutional design that allows
unfettered state authority over land-use or subnational forest policy,
thus restricting the use of prescriptive instruments at the federal level,
can lock in the use of lax (or perhaps no) protections of natural capital
within state or local government jurisdictions in the absence of
changes in constitutional structure (allocation of governance
authority)—a regime logic the modification of which is a daunting
task given the history of subnational government authority over land
use and forests in the United States. Even so, a change in the
governance mode may become necessary to forge a new trajectory for
the policy instruments chosen and for their design. In fact,
constitutions may very well be the prime example of how regime
logics and governance modes maintain instrument choice and policy
design inertia, even in the face of evidence that better process,
program, and political success could be achieved with an adjustment to
constitutional institutions.
Ultimately, two of the most important “policy contexts” for
policy design and its relative success may very well be constitutional
136. Id. at 140 (citations omitted).

698

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:669

allocation of governance authority and limits on a government’s ability
to restrict certain individual rights—after all, policies may not be
successful without recognizing these constraints. In this way, “[t]here
is a temporal aspect to . . . policy designs [sic] contexts . . . which
policy designers must also take into account,” and “the leeway or
degree of manoeuvrability [sic] policy designers have in developing
new designs is influenced not only by existing contextual factors and
polity features but also by historical-institutionalist ones.”137 While it
may be that these statements refer to historical mixes of specific policy
instruments—prescriptive regulation, taxes, subsidies, market-based
tools, public disclosure, and so on—this analysis remains no less true
of the institutions that lay the framework for allowable policy
instruments and their mixing. In other words, constitutional inertia
segmenting authority in a way that fragments policy making between
levels of government or locking in a particular conception of
government intrusion into individual rights constrains the leeway
policy designers have in adjusting that constitutional structure—
primarily because it requires much more than a simple majority to
change constitutional rules. For example, changing institutional
design in the United States either requires explicit changes to
constitutional text by a “super-supermajority,”138 so to speak, or a
radical departure from precedential judicial interpretation of
constitutional text.
Each of these factors makes change in institutional design an
exceedingly difficult task. Nonetheless, policy design study maintains
a broad goal of “constructing an inventory of potential public
capabilities and resources that might be pertinent in any problemsolving situation.”139 Review of institutional design through a process
we might call “institutional authority analysis” should be included in
this inventory. This analysis would assist policy makers in assessing
the government’s institutional capacity to create policy on particular
scales of governance so that it can remedy the institutional deficiency

137. Id. at 144; accord Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid & Lois R. Wise, Transforming
Administrative Policy, 80 PUB. ADMIN. 153 (2002).
138. See infra text accompanying note 170. See generally U.S. CONST. art. V
(describing the process for amending the U.S. Constitution); Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe
Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 925 (2012) (arguing that governments can remedy constitutional deficiencies to improve
climate and forest governance).
139. Charles W. Anderson, Comparative Policy Analysis: The Design of Measures, 4
COMP. POL. 117, 122 (1971).
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should the value of the desired policy outweigh the value in
maintaining the institutional status quo.

D.

Instrument Choice and Institutions: Constitutions as “MetaInstruments” and “Policy Supersystems”

Innovative and effective policy design requires that the parameters of
instrument choice be well understood, both to reduce the risk of policy
failure and to enhance the probability of policy success.140
Policy instruments may be thought of as the “contents of the
toolbox from which governments must choose in building or creating
public policies,” and therefore are an inherent part of policy design.141
Policy instruments are likely to be networked with a number of other
instruments in a set of “policy mixes.”142 Importantly, of course, these
mixes can occur across scales at different levels of government. This is
a fact that has not gone entirely unnoticed in policy studies, with
scholars noting that federal systems in particular “guarantee these sorts
of intertwined arrangements in virtually all policy sectors.”143 Even so,
this acknowledgment deals primarily with the politics of federalism in
complicating policy responses, rather than focusing on the legal,
institutional complications posed by federalism or the interpretation of
constitutional provisions related to individual rights.144 As Arthur
Ringeling acknowledges, “The question of legality of public policy is
perhaps one of the oldest questions about public policy. But
amazingly, for a long time it was almost fully absent from the policy
sciences.”145 Stated differently:
Practitioners of the policy sciences almost forgot that governments are
not free in the instruments they select. . . . [G]overnments [cannot] act
without an adequate legal foundation in the law. . . .
140. Michael Howlett, What Is a Policy Instrument?, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:
FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 31, 49.
141. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 22.
142. Hans Th. A. Bressers & Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr., Instrument Selection and
Implementation in a Networked Context, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS
TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 132, 135-37.
143. Id. at 137.
144. Id. at 138-39, 146-47. Bressers and O’Toole come close to providing a home for
analysis of legal aspects of policy mixes when they note that one important factor in
determining the efficacy of instruments is to consider whether multiple levels of government
are at play, and if so, “[h]ow is the interaction between various levels of governance
organized?” Id. at 146. Clearly, this organization arises from constitutional authority at both
the national and state levels.
145. Arthur B. Ringeling, Instruments in Four: The Elements of Policy Design, in
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 185, 187.
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So the possibilities available to policy makers in choosing between
different instruments are to an important extent limited by considerations of legality. The amazing thing is that practitioners of the policy
sciences seem to have forgotten this consideration when they developed
146
ideas about optimal instrument choice.

Policy scholars have at least begun the journey down this road,
acknowledging in a preliminary manner the complicating effect of
federal systems on instrument choice and noting that “[o]ne of the
most significant aspects of the political system affecting public policy
is whether it is federal or unitary.”147 These scholars argue that in
unitary systems “the existence of a clear chain of command or
hierarchy linking the different levels of government together in a
superordinate/subordinate relationship reduces the complexity of
multi-level governance and policy-making.”148 Thus, in nations like
Britain, France, and Japan, “the national government retains all
decision-making powers,” and “[i]t can choose to delegate these
powers to lower levels of government or dictate to them, but the role of
the central, national government is legally unchallenged.”149 Federal
political systems, like Australia, Brazil, India, Russia, Canada, and the
United States, of course, maintain multiple levels of government and
“are not bound together in a superordinate/subordinate relationship
but, rather, enjoy more or less complete discretion in matters under
their jurisdiction and guaranteed by the constitution.”150 Scholars have
attributed “weak policy capacity” in certain sectors in the United
States and Canada to federalism151 and in particular note the
complications posed when each level of government in a federal
system is “subject to unpredictable judicial review of their measures,
which further restricts governments’ ability to realize their
objectives.”152 As a result, “Federalism thus makes public policymaking a long, drawn-out, and often rancorous affair as the different
governments wrangle over jurisdictional issues or are involved in
extensive intergovernmental negotiations or constitutional litigation.”153
This wrangling driven by constitutional federalism has a marked
impact on instrument choice.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 198-99.
HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id. See generally Hudson, Regulating Climate Change, supra note 61.
HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 60.
Id.
Id.
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The field of instrument choice has been described by scholars as
“a commitment to understanding policy formulation and
implementation, as well as the policy-making process itself, by
focusing on instruments of government action rather than on policies
and programs.”154 Recent research has been aimed at “improving the
knowledge framework for evaluating instruments and at providing
better knowledge about how they contribute to government
performance overall” to achieve “the fundamental objective of good
instrument choices: good governance.”155 These instruments may
include prescriptive regulation, subsidies and taxation, privatization,
and information dissemination.156 Each of these involve either the use
or express limitation of state authority.157
While instrument choice scholars have demonstrated interest in
the nature of regulatory institutions as a general matter,158 one of the
reasons why legal institutions, like constitutions, have been left out of
the study of instrument choice is that the field seems to be dominated
by political scientists and economists,159 and not legal scholars per se.
Regardless, policy scholars have queried, “What are the constraints
and impediments blocking optimal instrument use in the design and
implementation of governance strategies?”160 One of those constraints
is constitutional and should be more fully integrated into our
understandings of instrument choice.
In fact, we can describe constitutions as “meta-instruments” that
have the decisive impact on the choice of other instruments, as they
may make the use of certain instruments, such as prescriptive
regulation, unavailable to policy makers at one or more levels of
government.161 Instrument choice theory, while focusing on the
instruments that arise out of institutions and how they may or may not
be used to steer policy, has not been sufficiently expanded to study
154. Pearl Eliadis, Margaret M. Hill & Michael Howlett, Introduction to DESIGNING
GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 3, 4.
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 4; see also JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE,
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 69-77 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the common tools
used to manage natural resources).
157. Howlett, supra note 140, at 31.
158. Margaret M. Hill, Tools as Art: Observations on the Choice of Governing
Instrument, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1,
at 21, 28; see also CHANGING REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN AND NORTH AMERICA (G.
Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks eds., 1998) (discussing the importance of political and
institutional regulation).
159. Howlett, supra note 140, at 31.
160. Id. at 34.
161. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21.
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meta-instruments like constitutions. After all, constitutions give rise to
all other instruments. Not only do they lay the groundwork for
governmental authority (at different levels) to prescriptively regulate,162
but they also establish spending powers that facilitate subsidies;163
taxing powers that facilitate taxation;164 powers related to the creation,
protection, and regulation of private property rights;165 and a suite of
powers that may be used to incentivize or compel information
dissemination from government entities166 or private parties.167
A home for constitutions as meta-instruments is not without at
least cursory contemplation within the literature. We might consider
constitutions as falling within the procedural instrument category of
instrument choice theory, which includes institution creation and
reform.168 The specific policy instruments chosen by policy makers
and the processes through which they utilize them are termed
“subsystems.”169 Constitutions, then, are the “policy supersystems”
within which policy subsystems are situated. In this way, change to the
policy supersystem of constitutional governance may necessitate the
use of policy subsystems to achieve institutional or constitutional
reform. So, for example, one way to change the structure of the
constitutional supersystem in the United States is to have either twothirds of both houses of Congress or two-thirds of state governments
propose a constitutional amendment, which then must be ratified by
three-quarters of state governments.170 This is action that utilizes
procedural instruments within a policy subsystem to adjust the
constitutional supersystem. Without such an adjustment, the constitutional supersystem may constrain the use of certain instruments like
prescriptive regulation at certain levels of government.

162. Such as through the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
163. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
164. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
165. Id. amend. V. The powers of eminent domain, common law doctrines like
nuisance and the public trust doctrine, and powers based on the state’s police power to protect
the public, like zoning authority, provide other examples. See generally Hudson, Nested
Commons Governance, supra note 61 (describing the operation of nested natural capital
commons created by some federal structures).
166. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2012).
167. In the environmental context, ecolabeling requirements provide an example.
RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 156, at 74.
168. Howlett, supra note 140, at 36.
169. Id. at 38.
170. U.S. CONST. art. V. Another way to adjust the constitutional superstructure is
through new judicial interpretations of constitutional text.
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Just as with policy design more broadly, policy scholars of the
sociological and historical neoinstitutionalism mold have keyed on the
role of institutions in guiding instrument choice, noting that “[t]he
choice of policy instruments depends on the institutional context of the
actors involved.”171 Constitutional federalism is clearly the concrete
context in which policy making occurs across scales in countries like
the United States and Canada, and the decentralized governance
promoted by this more potent form of federalism (being constitutional
rather than merely political in form) dictates many of the policy-tool
trade-offs in a variety of subject areas, including private forestry,
nonpoint source pollution, and land-use planning more generally.
Furthermore, this institutional context explains why constitutional
structure and value preference for relatively strong decentralized
federalism in these subject areas is so hard to change: “instrument
(re)design is never an isolated choice; it is always linked to a historical
process.”172 In this way, “The rationality of participants in the [policy]
design process is not only rationally bounded, but also bound to an
institutional context.”173 Thus, institutional context combined with
rationality might be considered a form of “reasonable rationality.”174
The dilemma presented by reasonable rationality is thus:
On the one hand, neglecting institutions may lead to unviable
instruments that cannot be successfully advocated and implemented; on
the other hand, designing in perfect conformity with existing
institutions may drastically reduce the scope of instrument choices as
well as the possibility of developing solutions contributing efficiently to
175
induce changes in behaviour likely to solve problems . . . .

This is the case, for example, in land-use regulatory areas in the United
States, such as nonpoint source water pollution, subnational forestry,
isolated wetlands, and direct land-use planning activities generally. In
these areas, if we ignore constitutional constraints—for example,
constraints on federal authority to prescriptively intervene with
171. Réjean Landry & Frédéric Varone, The Choice of Policy Instruments:
Confronting the Deductive and the Interactive Approaches, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:
FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 106, 114; accord Peter A. Hall &
Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD.
936 (1996); Réjean Landry, Rational Choice and Canadian Policy Studies, in POLICY STUDIES
IN CANADA: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 80, at 170.
172. Landry & Varone, supra note 171, at 114.
173. Id. at 115.
174. Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard, Rediscovering Reasonable Rationality in Institutional
Analysis, 29 EUR. J. POL. RES. 31 (1996).
175. Landry & Varone, supra note 171, at 115.
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minimum standards in the event that subnational governments refuse
to act—we might advocate for unviable instruments that ultimately fail
for a number of reasons. First, the policy may not garner enough
political support for enactment. Or, even if political support exists, the
policy is passed by a legislature, and is even implemented by executive
agencies, the policy might fail when challenged constitutionally by
private property owners or subnational governments. On the other
hand, if we were to develop instruments in line with a constitutionally
dualistic institutional state of affairs,176 then these instruments would
not be robust enough to change behavior. We see this, for example,
with regard to the numerous voluntary programs aimed at subnational
forest and coastal resources that have been holistically ineffectual.177
Ultimately, though we tend to think about instrument choice in
terms of “policy instrument choice,”178 there is a precursor to that
inquiry that can be termed “institutional instrument choice” or,
perhaps more precisely, “constitutional instrument choice.” The choice
of constitutional instrument dictates the availability of all other policy
instruments, so evaluation of a constitutional instrument is a
precondition to the evaluation of policy instruments if we are to gain a
holistic approach to policy success and failure.

E.

Policy Success and Failure: Integrating Institutional Success

Though there has been much study of policy failure,179 policy
success has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature.180 Allan
McConnell calls this oversight a “significant gap in our understanding
of the world.”181 As noted earlier, policy success theory to date has
divided success into three categories: process, program, and political
176. See Engel, supra note 41; Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism To
Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1991.
177. See the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012); section
319 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012); and Forest Legacy Program:
Protecting Private Forest Lands from Conversion to Non-Forest Uses, U.S. FOREST SERVICE,
http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/programs/loa/aboutflp.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2015), for
examples and a discussion of voluntary conservation programs. See also Jessica Owley &
Stephen J. Tulowiecki, Who Should Protect the Forest?: Conservation Easements in the
Forest Legacy Program, 33 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47 (2012) (discussing
conservation easements in the forest legacy program).
178. Landry & Varone, supra note 171, at 107.
179. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 21.
180. Id. at 3 (noting that such scholarship is limited in scope and in number to a
handful of projects).
181. Id.
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success.182 The aim of this Article, of course, is to integrate a fourth
category, institutional success, into policy success theory.
Perhaps the most useful way to compare institutional success
with prior success categorizations is to draw contrasts between
institutional and program success, the latter of which is the primary
way in which society thinks about policy successes and failures—that
is, “did the policy work?” In many ways determining program success
is fraught with far more subjectivity than determining institutional
success. Reasonable people may disagree over whether the substance
of a particular policy resulted in outcomes that matched the policy’s
goals. This is particularly true when policies will rarely, if ever, be
forged out of unanimous consent. A large number of detractors who
never agreed with the substance of the policy to begin with will likely
continue to view it as a failure, even if it does achieve some or all of its
original aims. Likewise, supporters may view, through rose-colored
glasses, an objectively weak policy as a success. Consider the
continued characterization of Obamacare as a success by supporters183
and as a failure by detractors.184 This adds political distortion on top of
the already difficult task of objectively weighing a policy’s
programmatic results against its purported goals.
Policy scholars have noted the difficulties in evaluating program
success or failure. Should success be evaluated in a subjective, valueladen manner (a success to those in favor of the policy and a failure to
those opposed to it)185 or in an objective and impartial manner (did the
policy achieve what it set out to achieve and maximize benefits relative
to costs)?186 The latter may be heavily data-driven and is an approach
particularly favored among U.S. policy analysts.187 Even so, is a policy
a success if it achieves its original goals, but those goals were
illegitimate?188 Such may be the case, for example, if a policy is seen
182. Id. at 42-43, 46, 49-54; see also Parsons, supra note 13, at 43-60 (arguing that
evidence-based policy making enhances control of the policy-making process); Sanderson,
supra note 13 (arguing that evidence-based policy making should include theory-based
analysis of long-term impact).
183. Biden on Health Care Sign-Ups: ‘Hell of a Start,’ CNN (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:40
AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/20/biden-on-health-care-sign-ups-hell-ofa-start/?hpt=hp_t2.
184. Josh Kraushaar, Democrats in Denial over Obamacare, NAT’L J. (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/against-the-grain/democrats-in-denial-over-obamacare-2014
0218.
185. McConnell calls this the antifoundationalist position. MCCONNELL, supra note 7,
at 31.
186. McConnell calls this the foundationalist position. Id.
187. Id. at 12-13.
188. Id. at 14.
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as creating economic inequalities or compromising democratic
processes.189 A further complication of determining program success
or failure is that in the typical policy scenario a policy that is not
considered a success is not necessarily a failure—policies can succeed
in some ways but not in others and can be characterized as succeeding
mostly or only in part. Indeed, McConnell describes a spectrum from
success to failure, noting that success is not an “all or nothing
phenomenon” and that “[t]otal policy success is uncommon, as is total
policy failure.”190
Contrast the subjectivity-fraught evaluation of program success
with the type of institutional success upon which this Article focuses,
which involves a relatively straightforward determination: did the
level of government (federal, state, or local) guiding the policy through
the policy cycle have the legal authority to craft the policy in the first
instance? Did the government unconstitutionally infringe upon legally
protected individual rights? Determining whether legal authority
exists or whether a constitutional right was infringed can certainly be
litigious affairs, as proponents of the policy make arguments that a law
or its application is constitutional and opponents make counterarguments that it is not. Once a determination is made, however, we can
have a relative degree of certainty regarding whether a policy
institutionally succeeds (that is, is allowed to proceed in its current
form). Such a determination may occur in a number of ways and quite
often occurs at the evaluation stage through a judicial ruling. It may
also occur if a legislative body withdraws a policy due to the mere
threat of legal challenge or because of political backlash. In this way,
analysis of constitutional authority as the focus of institutional success
may be a much neater analysis than determination of program success
because post-judicial ruling, there are no gradations along an
institutional success/failure spectrum (unless, of course, the judicial
ruling is later overturned—which is certainly a possibility and can
make institutional success evaluation much messier). Institutional
success evaluation, therefore, may simplify the otherwise
overwhelmingly complex task of policy evaluation191—a policy may
189. Examples might be tax policies characterized as exacerbating wealth disparity in
the United States, see Jillian Berman, Income Inequality Greatly Exacerbated By U.S. Tax
System: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2013, 1:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/06/17/income-inequality-tax-system_n_3454216.html, or corporations having the
same constitutionally protected right to participate in campaign contribution activities as do
individual citizens, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
190. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 55.
191. See id. at 160-95.
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either institutionally fail with 100% certainty if it is found that a level
of government maintains no authority or unconstitutionally infringes
on individual rights, or it may institutionally succeed with 100%
certainty. A new debate may ensue subsequent to that determination to
try to adjust those outcomes, and new arguments regarding
constitutional interpretation may be put forth and eventually
accepted.192 But for the time after a judicial ruling until a change in
such ruling, a policy’s institutional success or failure is determinable.
Not only may institutional success analysis be more clean-cut, but
it also may provide more information regarding the viability of policies
across a wide range of subject matter. McConnell posits that there are
numerous reasons why the study of policy success is important,
including discerning insights regarding “the transferability of
conditions for success to other sectors and jurisdictions[,] the capacity
of successful programmes to be enduring[,] whether we are more
liable to learn from successes or failures[, and] our ability to predict
success.”193 While each of these insights may be of varying degrees of
utility regarding program success, because there are so many variables
distinguishing the substance of differing policies, the utility of these
insights for an assessment of institutional success is more straightforward. With this Article’s narrow definition of institutional
success—that is, legal authority for a level of government to craft and
implement a particular regulatory policy without constraint—these
propositions form into something more definite. First, once there is a
judicial ruling on constitutional authority or a constitutional change in
an institution to reallocate legal authority, we gain fairly direct
understandings of how to apply that constitutional principle or change
that institution in other contexts. As Allan McConnell notes, there is
an argument that in the “federal states versus unitary states” category
of political science study “any two countries . . . might share
substantial similarities. Hence, there is some chance, all things being
equal, that what works in one context will be of value in another.”194
This is definitely the case as between the United States and Canada,
for example, where the constitutional constraints on one federal
government in the subnational forest management context may tell us
a great deal about those constraints in the other country.195 Second, we
192. See Brigham Daniels & Blake Hudson, Our Constitutional Commons, 49 GA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014).
193. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 196.
194. Id. at 200.
195. See Hudson, supra note 138.
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also learn with some degree of certainty whether a policy program will
be enduring—if there is no legal authority, then we know that it will
not endure. If there is legal authority, then overall endurance depends
on a number of other factors related to programmatic and political
success. Third, as noted earlier, in the institutional context success and
failure are more directly characterized as flip sides of the same coin. If
there is no legal authority to act, then we learn equally from this as
both a lack of success and as a failure. And finally, what we learn
about constitutional conflicts and institutional design characteristics
can help us predict ways to achieve institutional successes in the
future.
In the final analysis, because the rules for processes, programs,
and politics ultimately emanate from constitutions, establishing
successful institutions is critical to the success of the other dimensions.
While institutional authority for a certain level of government to
formulate policy cannot guarantee process, program, or political
success, lack of institutional authority can guarantee policy failure, at
least in that form and at that level of government. It guarantees failure
in that form because a government could certainly utilize
nonprescriptive, voluntary measures as the policy instrument or pay
compensation to private property owners if it is able to do so. In other
words, there are other policy forms the government could utilize. Lack
of institutional authority guarantees failure at that level of government
because the same policy, if prescriptive, may be adopted by other
levels of government. Even so, nonprescriptive approaches may not be
efficacious, governments may not be able to pay just compensation
and may abandon the policy, and other levels of government may not
engage in policy making on that subject matter.
With constitutional authority as the focus, what must be
determined is whether it does or does not exist and whether its exercise
does or does not infringe on constitutionally protected rights. So, for
example, if the federal government is found not to have constitutional
authority to maintain prescriptive inputs into certain regulatory areas,
then both proponents and opponents would see attempts by the federal
government to so regulate as failures—proponents would do so
begrudgingly while opponents would do so gladly. As McConnell
describes:
A policy fails insofar as it does not achieve the goals that proponents set
out to achieve. Those supportive of the original goals are liable to
perceive, with regret, an outcome of policy failure. Opponents are also
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likely to perceive failures, with satisfaction, because they did not
196
support the original goals.

Take the case of Morrison as an illustration. Proponents of the
Violence Against Women Act would reluctantly admit that the policy
had institutionally failed due to the Supreme Court’s finding of a lack
of federal constitutional authority (though they may disagree with that
judicial interpretation). Those opposed to the policy and the
corresponding expanded degree of federal authority would also
perceive the policy as a failure—and justifiably so in their view.
Integrating institutional analysis earlier in the policy cycle can help
governments turn these types of institution-driven policy failures into
policy successes. These policy successes, in turn, can tell us a great
deal more about better policy making in the future than can ex post
analysis of policy failures.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES FOR
POLICY SUCCESS: COASTAL ZONE AND PRIVATE FOREST
MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES
The mechanisms this Article develops for integrating institutional
analysis into the policy success framework may be applied to a wide
variety of policy subject areas, from civil rights to intellectual property
to international law and beyond. They can also be applied to a variety
of national governance structures—in particular, federal systems with
constitutional constraints similar to those in the United States. There
are two areas in the United States where vulnerabilities are likely to
play a substantial role in impeding policy success. These subject areas
are within the environmental policy and land-use planning arenas and
include the role of coastal land-use planning and subnational forest
management in responding to climate change.
Remedying
institutional vulnerabilities in these areas will be critical if society is to
design policies that both mitigate and adapt to climate change effects
in the coming decades.

A. Land Use in the Coastal Zone
As described in this Subpart, new approaches to land-use
planning in the coastal zone will be critical to adapting to climate
change effects. As sea levels rise and disaster events like hurricaneinduced flooding increase, municipalities, industrial developments,
196. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 56.
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and other entities in close proximity to the coast must make difficult
choices on how to adapt to the inevitably rising tide. Society will not
only need to move away from vulnerable parts of the coast, but when
settlement or development occurs further inland, it will need to
proceed in a new way. Society must learn from the development
mistakes of the past and establish new, more robust buffer zones
between the new coastline and future development. Society will also
need to set aside more natural capital in developments through better
use of density requirements or urban growth boundaries. Such new
and, some would say, radical approaches to land-use planning will be
necessary if society is to forestall the worst effects of climate change in
the coastal zone, which currently is home to more than half of the U.S.
population.197
Coastal land-use planning implicates both types of constitutional
vulnerability highlighted in Part II. First, direct land-use planning in
the United States exemplifies constraints on governance authority at
various levels of government perhaps better than any other subject
matter. In the United States, the regulatory authority to engage in
direct land-use planning on private lands, which is critical to
controlling development, reigning in urban sprawl, and protecting
natural capital, is currently placed completely under the control of state
governments (though it may be granted to local governments under
home rule laws).198 The Supreme Court has made reference to “the
States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”199 describing
land-use regulation as “a quintessential state and local power.”200
Congress actually exempts a number of activities from federal
statutes in order to avoid federal “intrusion” into land-use planning.
Consider the example of nonpoint source water pollution under the
197. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L
OCEAN SERV.: POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980-2008 (2004).
198. See supra text accompanying note 21; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887); JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public
Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78
IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003); James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural
Resource Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010).
199. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994), for
the proposition that “regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local
governments”).
200. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the
quintessential state activity.”)).
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Clean Water Act, which is unregulated at the federal level but also the
greatest contributor to water quality impairment in the United States.201
Again, federal hesitancy is due in part to conceptions of exclusive state
and local authority over land-use regulation,202 leaving states as the
“exclusive regulators of nonpoint source pollution.”203 The role of
nonpoint source water pollution regulation in complicating the policymaking process has been highlighted in the policy studies literature.204
Policy scholars have used the case study of nonpoint source pollution
to explore the many characteristics that define particular policy
problems,205 which can tell us much about coastal land-use planning
more generally. One of these characteristics is “interdependencies,”
which implicates whether a problem cuts vertically across scales of
governance or horizontally across agencies within the same level of
governance. The interdependencies in coastal land-use planning
related to climate change are vast, as the problems cut vertically across
scales of governance and horizontally across entities within the same
level of governance.
In fact, the issue of interdependencies is of particular relevance to
the role of constitutions in the policy-making process. Scholars have
noted that land-use planning (such as the control of nonpoint source
water pollution) gives rise to more interdependencies than other policy
areas, primarily because it cuts across a variety of sectors, such as
environmental protection, commercial and residential development,
agriculture, forestry, and local zoning. In this way, land-use planning
is a problem that is especially prone to cutting vertically across
scales—the federal government is implicated in agricultural policy
while state and local governments are responsible for land-use
planning and zoning—as well as horizontally across federal agencies
and thousands of subnational governments within the same scale. The
role of governance authority across and within scales is significant and
is perhaps the ultimate backdrop to the intractability of the coastal
land-use problem. State and local governments perceive a sphere of
201. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation’s Largest Water Quality Problem, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/outreach/point1.cfm (last visited Jan.
24, 2015).
202. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 27 (2002).
203. Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of
Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 179 (2000).
204. Peters & Hoornbeek, supra note 99, at 86-105.
205. Id. at 86-99.
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land-use regulatory authority protected from federal interference, and
thus far, the federal government has been unwilling to test that
assertion of constitutional authority.
Though policy scholars have overlooked the role of constitutional
federalism in driving the failure to craft nonpoint source water
pollution policies, “the current move toward decentralized and
nonregulatory policy instruments in nonpoint-source water-pollution
control may find grounding in the political and causal complexity of
the problems involved, in their broad scope, and in their significant
policy interdependence.”206 The same may be said of coastal land-use
planning in a time of climate change. If state and local governments
continue to act individually rational but collectively deficient in efforts
to adapt, then needed adjustments in development patterns are unlikely
to occur, increasing the risk of human, economic, and natural capital
losses as sea levels rise. The federal government will likely need to
step in and coordinate retreat from the most vulnerable areas. If it is
unable to do so, then an unmitigated policy failure looms on the
horizon.
Yet, it is not only constitutional constraints on federal authority
that expose the governance authority constitutional vulnerability in the
coastal land-use planning context. The federal government has made
attempts to quash state and local authority over zoning authority for the
siting and permitting of oil refineries and other utilities,207 and states
have succeeded in stripping local governments of authority to do so.208
Each of these categories of action is based on claimed constitutional
powers of preemption. This could have damaging impacts on the
abilities of lower levels of government to move infrastructure out of
high-risk areas or to preserve natural capital as a buffer to climaterelated disaster events. In other areas, local governments are losing
autonomy that could be useful for adapting to climate change through
land-use planning as states are “transfer[ing] authority over armoring
from local to state control.”209 Each of these governance authority
206. Id. at 104.
207. See Gasoline for America’s Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong.
§ 102(b)(1) (2005); Engel, supra note 41, at 185.
208. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2006);
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85.
209. J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and
Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 97 n.127 (2012) (citing Connecticut’s Act Concerning the Coastal
Management Act and Shoreline Flood and Erosion Control Structures, S.B. 376, 2012 Reg.
Sess. (Conn. 2012); Maryland’s Living Shoreline Protection Act of 2008, MD. CODE ANN.,
ENVIR. § 16-201 (West 2014)).

2015]

PRECONDITIONS FOR POLICY SUCCESS

713

vulnerabilities needs to be remedied in order to facilitate coastal landuse planning policy successes.
The individual rights vulnerability plays a particularly acute role
in land-use planning in the coastal zone, especially as related to
climate change adaptation. Consider the Lucas case described in Part
II.B. If states or municipalities wish to prevent further development in
areas likely to be inundated, and doing so wipes out certain forms of
economic development value of a landowner’s property, the
government would be hard-pressed to defend a takings claim. Peter
Byrne has highlighted a number of other ways in which this
vulnerability may play out.210 Takings claims may be brought by
property owners if the state renourishes beaches and claims the
reclaimed beach as public property;211 regulations prohibit property
owners from armoring their properties to combat rising seas;212
governments construct levees that send floodwaters to other
properties;213 governments refuse to construct levees to protect some
property owners even though they construct them for others;214
governments find it necessary to breach levees in certain locations to
avoid worse flood damage elsewhere;215 state or local governments
mandate retreat from rising seas by “prohibiting, limiting, or
conditioning new development or rebuilding” (as was the case in
Lucas);216 or governments fail to maintain access to “marooned”
property by refusing to rebuild roads or bridges that are continually
wiped away through erosive forces or other storm and sea level rise
impacts.217 Ultimately, as with the governance authority vulnerability,
this constitutional rights institutional vulnerability will need to be
remedied in order to achieve coastal land-use planning policy
successes and to avoid the worst impacts of climate change along the
coast.

B.

Subnational Forestry

Forests are critical to combatting climate change. Twenty percent
of yearly carbon emissions worldwide over the last few decades are
210. See Byrne, supra note 209.
211. Id. at 82 (discussing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010)).
212. Id. at 88, 100-01.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 91-92.
215. Id. at 91.
216. Id. at 97.
217. Id. at 103-04.
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attributable to deforestation and forest degradation.218 Forest cover in
the United States has been fairly stable over the past century,219 but new
threats loom. For example, the United States Forest Service’s 2011
Southern Forests Futures Project Summary Report220 detailed that
population growth, climate change, changes in timber markets, and
invasive species will remove copious amounts of forest resources in
the coming decades.221 Urban development in particular is projected to
consume thirty to forty-three million acres of southern land by 2060,
while contributing to total forest losses of up to twenty-three million
acres, which is approximately 13% of all southern forestland.222 A key
driver of these threats is the combination of lax land-use planning in
the South and the fact that 86% of southern forests are privately
owned.223 Sixty percent of forests are privately owned nationwide, and
the federal government only maintains direct inputs into the 35% of
U.S. forests in federal ownership.224
The division of governance authority between state and federal
governments in the area of land-use planning, thoroughly discussed in
the previous Subpart, plays a key role in preventing the federal
government from curbing state rationality in this area. As Gerald Rose
has noted, “Under the US Constitution, the federal government has
limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for
the states. Forestland management and use was one such reserved
power.”225 In other words, regulation of 60% of U.S. forests and
protection of those resources from urban sprawl and other
development or resource extraction impacts is the responsibility of
fifty states and nearly 88,000 subnational governments in the United
218. CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT, BENJAMIN CASHORE & PETER KANOWSKI, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 6 (2010).
219. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 156, at 1198-1200.
220. David N. Wear & John G. Greis, The Southern Forest Futures Project: Summary
Report, USDA S. FOREST FUTURES (May 12, 2011), http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/
reports/draft/summary_report.pdf. The report reviewed thirteen states: Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at 4 fig.1.
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id. at 35. See generally Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH &
LEE L. REV. 1643 (2014) (discussing the destruction of southern forests).
223. Wear & Greis, supra note 220, at 62.
224. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT &
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002).
225. Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the US, in THE
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce
Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005); accord JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW 849 (2006).
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States226—absent any federal regulatory forest-management inputs.
Whether these constitutional constraints on federal authority are real or
illusory is uncertain because it is unclear if the federal government
cannot legally act, or if rather it simply refuses politically to act out of
perceived legal constraints. Regardless, the institutional vulnerability
remains.
The interrelation between land-use planning and forest management has become far more complicated in recent decades, even as
climate change has brought attention to the growing importance of
forest resources. Between 1998 and 2010, large commercial timber
companies in the southeastern United States have rapidly divested their
timber holdings, resulting in smaller forested properties that are
“subject to new dynamic forces that encourage parcelization and
fragmentation.”227 This transition has been described as “the most
substantial transition in forest ownership of the last century,” as
industry sold nearly three-quarters of its forest holdings.228 Much of
this forestland was purchased by real estate investment trusts
(REITs).229 Most REITs are interested primarily in the commercial
value of the land upon which the timber exists for commercial,
residential, or industrial development.230 The timber is merely
incidental to property ownership, and as a result these forestlands are
now subject to increased development pressures seeking to replace
forest resources with urban sprawl.231
If a large number of states continue to refuse to protect forest
resources from the impacts of urban sprawl and other development
over the next fifty years, the federal government will need to do so.
Such protections may necessarily seek to “keep forests forested”
through the use of regulatory instruments like growth boundaries and
limit lines around large municipalities,232 development-density
requirements establishing preservation of forests on certain acreages of
property,233 or stand-density and clear-cutting requirements aimed at
226. BARBARA A. BARDES, MACK C. SHELLEY II & STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT, AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY 89 (2010).
227. Wear & Greis, supra note 220, at 58.
228. Id. at 60, 62.
229. Id. at 60.
230. Carol Whitlock, An Industry Always in Transition, 16 COMPASS 1, 3 (2010).
231. Id.
232. Rural Development in Oregon, OR. DEP’T LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., http://
www.oregon.gov/LCD/pages/ruraldev.aspx#Rural_Development_in_Oregon (last visited Jan.
24, 2015).
233. Forest Conservation Ordinance, WASH. CNTY., MD., DEP’T PLANNING & ZONING,
http://www.washco-md.net/planning/forest.shtm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
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industries engaged in forestry activities,234 among a variety of other
prescriptive policies. Yet, these are regulatory roles currently reserved
to subnational governments.235 And in many areas, such as the U.S.
South, the most basic of forest preservation standards are not even
utilized—most southern states rely almost entirely on voluntary best
management practices.236 There are certainly arguments that the
federal government might prescriptively reach these areas under its
Commerce Clause power to establish a minimum standards
framework,237 but that premise simply has not been tested because
Congress has never attempted to prescriptively regulate subnational
forests.
Furthermore, as with land-use planning in the coastal zone, not
only may the federal government be constrained by subnational actors,
but local governments who wish to manage forests to combat climate
change may be prevented from doing so if states preempt their
management activities under the pretense of fostering commercial,
residential, industrial, or other economic developments within their
borders. These are each institutional vulnerabilities that may inhibit
much needed forest management policy success in the coming
decades.238
The constitutional infringement vulnerability, in the form of Fifth
Amendment takings claims, could theoretically be implicated if
federal, state, or local governments prohibit forest operations on
smaller parcels or require certain stand-density requirements that
would prohibit the cutting of virtually any trees. This is both an
unlikely policy response and a claim that would be unlikely to succeed
at the federal level if other economic values were preserved on the
property.239 At the state level, however, such claims may have even
more purchase if states require compensation for regulations that
devalue property by a certain degree.240 A number of other difficult
questions may arise. What if a REIT owns forested property outside a
newly instituted growth boundary? Forest preservation regulations
234. See Hudson, supra note 138.
235. Id. at 932-33.
236. See Hudson, supra note 138.
237. See Hudson, supra note 8.
238. See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821 (Cal. 2006).
Local regulation in this case was actually allowed to proceed despite claims of state
preemption. Nonetheless, states may attempt to prevent local government regulation if they
feel that such regulation might inhibit economic development activities within the state.
239. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
240. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2014); sources cited supra note 58.
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could effectively eviscerate almost all of the REIT’s economic value in
the land if they are unable to develop the property as originally
planned or sell it to another for those purposes. So while this type of
institutional vulnerability may be less cause for concern in the forest
management context, its potential to undermine policy and
institutional success remains.
V.

CONCLUSION

Understanding the nature of a policy space and its history are
prerequisites of successful design.241
In many systems of government, policy making occurs within a
policy space created by constitutional institutions. These institutions
have a history and are driven by an inertia that affects the viability of
certain regulatory instruments. If policy makers are constrained in
utilizing those regulatory instruments by constitutional rules of
governance or provision of individual rights, then important policies
that have already been designed and implemented may fail or may not
even be crafted in the first instance at appropriate levels of governance.
Understanding these effects and adjusting constitutional institutions
accordingly is a precondition for policy success.
To be clear, particular constitutional rules of governance or
provisions of individual rights may certainly have had value at one
time. Today, however, policy makers have new information regarding
the supply, utilization, scientific function, and value of certain
resources, like forests, wetlands, biodiversity, and other resources
readily replaced by development. As a result, for certain regulatory
areas, such as the intersection of land-use planning and natural
resource protection, those constitutional rules and protections are
outdated and archaic. Even though these institutions carry the heavy
weight of historical inertia, such inertia “does not mean . . . that
choices are inevitable or immutable or that substantial shifts in
implementation styles do not occur.”242 In other words, institutions like
constitutions can change, either through textual changes to the
constitution itself or through changes in constitutional interpretation.
This Article seeks to infuse constitutional analysis into the policy
literature by framing constitutions as meta-institutions central to
process, program, and political policy success. Integrating “institutional analysis” into the policy cycle literature, “institutional design”
241. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 145 (citing Schön, supra note 125).
242. Howlett, supra note 140, at 48.
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into the policy design literature, “meta-instruments” into the
instrument choice literature, and “institutional success” into the policy
success literature will be necessary to forge a holistic understanding of
policy making that is based more upon learning from success, rather
than only from failure.

